



The medical profession, like any other form of business, subjects
itself to potential antitrust liability when it engages in joint activity
designed to affect trade relations. One type of joint activity used by
the profession is the influencing of government bodies in order to attain
anticompetitive results favorable to physicians. This kind of joint ef-
fort in the commercial world is to some extent protected from the anti-
trust laws by the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. It is not at all clear,
however, to what degree this defense is available in the medical con-
text.
This Note will focus on the proper scope of the Noerr-Pennington
defense in the context of five case studies of actual or potential medical
antitrust cases. In each case, the potential antitrust violation is de-
scribed in sufficient detail to highlight the significance of the Noerr-
Pennington doctrine. This description is then followed by a discussion
of the proper use of the Noerr-Pennington defense. Through analyzing
the applicability of the Noerr-Pennington defense in each of the five
cases, this Note will examine the constitutional basis underlying the
doctrine, the judicially created exceptions, and the defense's limited ap-
plication to the activities of quasi-public, self-regulatory medical orga-
nizations.
I. NOERR-PENNINGTON. THE LEGAL DOCTRINE
Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight,
Inc. I was the first case exempting from the Sherman Act joint activities
aimed at attaining anticompetitive governmental decisions. In Noerr
several railroads had engaged in an intense publicity campaign in order
to influence legislation and obtain executive enforcement of laws that
would eliminate trucking companies as competitors for the lucrative
long distance heavy freight business.2 This publicity campaign involved
the use of front organizations that would send letters to State legislators
and the governor, making it seem as if public sentiment was against the
truckers.' The railroads were successful in their efforts, and the trck-
1. 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
2. Id at 142-43.
3. Id at 133.
DUKE L4WJOURNAL [.
ing companies brought an antitrust suit based on the railroads' an-
ticompetitive purpose and their use of a fraudulent publicity
campaign. 4
The lower courts found the railroads' activities were malicious and
fraudulent and constituted a violation of the Sherman Act;' however,
the Supreme Court reversed. In its opinion the Court put forth two
reasons for not applying the Sherman Act: first, Congress' intent was to
regulate monopolistic business practices and not political activity
designed to inform the executive and legislative branches of govern-
ment; and second, serious first amendment issues regarding the right to
petition the government would be raised if the Sherman Act were con-
strued to cover the lobbying activities of the railroads.' The Court fur-
ther stated that the purpose behind the political activity' and the
manner in which the activity was conducted' were relevant considera-
tions in the determination of whether or not the activity was immune
from the antitrust law. However, these factors were relevant if it could
be shown that the "publicity campaign, ostensibly directed toward in-
fluencing governmental action, [was] a mere sham to cover what [was]
actually nothing more than an attempt to interfere directly with the
business relationships of a competitor."9 This caveat to the Court's
holding established what has come to be called the "sham exception."10
Four years later the Court in United Mine Workers v. Pennington"
faced a similar question involving the joint efforts of the mine worker's
union and large mine operators to force small coal producers out of
business. 2 In Pennington the large mine owners and the union lobbied
with the Secretary of Labor in order to persuade him to use his author-
ity under the Walsh-Healy Act 3 to set higher wages for employees of
4. Id at 129-30.
5. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc. v. Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference, 155 F. Supp. 768 (E.D.
Pa. 1957), aftd, 273 F.2d 218 (3d Cir. 1959), rev'd, 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
6. Id at 137-38. Since Noerr some confusion has existed in the lower courts as to whether
the decision was based on statutory construction or first amendment grounds. Compare Bethle-
hem Plaza v. Campbell, 403 F. Supp. 966, 969 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (constitutional basis) with Cow
Palace, Ltd. v. Associated Milk Producers, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 696, 701-02 (D. Colo. 1975) (prima-
rily statutory grounds).
7. 365 U.S. 127, 138-40 (1961). The Court specifically stated that the legality of the rail-
roads' publicity campaign was "not at all affected by any anticompetitive purpose it may have
had." Id at 140.
8. Id at 140-42. The Court noted that the Sherman Act applied to the ethics of activities
involving trade restraints and not political activity. Id at 140.
9. Id at 144.
10. See text accompanying notes 53-60 infra.
11. 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
12. Id at 657-60.
13. 41 U.S.C. §§ 35-45 (1970). Under the Act the Secretary of Labor has the power to set,
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firms selling coal to the TVA.' 4 Further, this group urged the TVA to
curtail its buying from small coal operators in the spot market."5 In its
decision the Supreme Court held that the activities of the mine owners
and the union were immune from the antitrust laws' 6 and simultane-
ously extended the principle of Noerr by stating that "joint efforts to
influence public officials do not violate the antitrust laws even though
intended to eliminate competition." 7
The final Supreme Court decision to add significantly to the doc-
trine was California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited.8 In
Caifornia Motor Transport a group of trucking companies pursued a
practice of instituting state and federal administrative proceedings
against a rival, Trucking Unlimited, whenever Trucking Unlimited
would file for operating authority.' 9 Trucking Unlimited claimed that
this harassment through the use of administrative action had the effect
of eliminating it as a competitor.2"
In its opinion the Court dealt with two basic aspects of the Noerr
and Pennington cases. First, the Court extended the antitrust immu-
nity to cover concerted efforts before adjudicatory bodies by relying on
the first amendment right to petition the government for redress of
grievances. 2' This portion of the decision was a logical extension of the
within reasonable limits, the minimum wages that will be paid to employees of government con-
tractors. 41 U.S.C. § 35(b) (1970).
14. 381 U.S. at 660.
15. Id at 660-61.
16. Id at 670.
17. Id (emphasis added). The broad sweep of the statement by Mr. Justice White has been
criticized for ignoring the underlying basis of the Noerr decision, that the Sherman Act is aimed
at economic activity and should not be applied so as to interfere with the political decision making
process. Note, Application of the Sherman Act to Attempts to Influence Government Action, 81
HARV. L. REv. 847, 852 (1968). One commentator has observed that "the implication of Noerr
and Pennington are only limited by one's imagination." Costilo, Antitrust's Newest Quagmire: The
Noerr-Pennington Defense, 66 MICH. L. REv. 333, 339 (1967). Subsequent to the Pennington deci-
sion, some lower courts began to apply mechanically the doctrine whenever a private organization
or group of businesses would influence a government official. See Household Good Carrier's
Bureau v. Terrell, 452 F.2d 152 (5th Cir. 1971) (purchase of goods by government); Sun Valley
Disposal Co. v. Silver State Disposal Co., 420 F.2d 341 (9th Cir. 1969) (award of government
contracts); United States v. Johns-Manville Corp., 259 F. Supp. 440 (E.D. Pa. 1966) (influence of
product specifications for government contracts).
18. 404 U.S. 508 (1972).
19. Id at 509.
20. Trucking Unlimited v. California Motor Transport Co. [1967] Trade Cas. (CCH)
72,298 at 84,740 (N.D. Cal.), rev'd, 432 F.2d 755 (9th Cir. 1970), afl'd, 404 U.S. 508 (1972).
21. 404 U.S. 510-11. Fischel, Antitrust Liabilityfor Attempts to Influence GovernmentAction:
The Basis andLimits of the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 80, 94-96 (1977); see
Handler, Twenty-five Years of Antitrust, 73 COLUM. L. REv. 415, 435 (1973). The use of the first
amendment right of petition as a basis for the decision was not necessary. The Noerr Court had
interpreted the Sherman Act in such a way that it did not apply to situations involving business
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principle expressed in both Noerr and Pennington in that concerted
activities before governmental bodies, even though for anticompetitive
ends, do not, standing alone, violate the Sherman Act. Just as the leg-
islative and executive branches need information from the private
sector to make policy decisions, so do courts and administrative tribu-
nals.22 Yet, in extending the immunity the Court's opinion did little to
establish any clear guidelines for future decisions. Instead the verbal
formula expressed in Noerr and Pennington continues to be the only
guidepost.'
In the second part of the opinion, the Court did explain to some
degree the scope of the sham exception first noted in Noerr. The
Court stated that although "misrepresentation" is condoned in the po-
litical arena, it is not immunized when used in the adjudicatory proc-
ess."4 By differentiating between the political world and adjudicatory
hearings, the Court created a dual standard under the sham excep-
tion. 5 In the judicial-administrative setting a "sham" is easier to prove
because the complaining party need only show that the defendant's ac-
tivities abused the judicial process, rather than prove that the defend-
ant's acts were a cover for a direct interference in the complainant's
business.
In order to more clearly delineate the scope of the Noerr-
Pennington doctrine as applied to the medical profession, this Note will
activities aimed at informing executive and legislative bodies. This construction can be applied to
adjudicatory bodies since they also need information in order to decide policy-laden disputes
between competing litigants. See Note, Limiting the Antitrust Immunityfor Concerted Attempts to
Influence Courts and Adjudicatory Agencies: Analogies to Malicious Prosecution and Abuse of
Process, 86 HARv. L. REV. 715, 722 (1973).
22. For example, many administrative agencies, such as the ICC, conduct evidentiary hear-
ings on issues involving the particular regulated business. As Professor Davis points out, the
agency considers both specific adjudicatory facts dealing with the parties involved and general
legislative facts concerning the type of policy to be implemented. I K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW TREATISE § 7.02 at 413 (1958); see Note, supra note 21, at 722 n.43. A specific example of
this type of agency action can be found in the ICC's policy decision to restrict circuitous operating
practices of motor carriers that involve a wasteful use of fuel. Motor-Common Carriers of Prop-
erty, Routes, and Serv., 119 M.C.C. 530 (1974).
23. Most lower court decisions start with the proposition that the activity is immune from the
Sherman Act unless it can be shown by the complainant that the activity falls into an exception.
See, ag., Metro Cable Co. v. CATV of Rockford, Inc., 516 F.2d 220,224-28 (7th Cir. 1975); Rush-
Hampton Indus., Inc. v. Home Ventilating Inst., 419 F. Supp. 19, 22-25 (M.D. Fla. 1976); Bethle-
hem Plaza v. Campbell, 403 F. Supp. 966, 969-71 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
24. 404 U.S. at 513.
25. See Metro Cable Co. v. CATV of Rockford, Inc., 516 F.2d 220, 228 (7th Cir. 1975);
Note, The Quagmire Thickens: A Post-California Motor View of Antitrust and Constitutional
Ramintcations of Petitioning the Government, 42 U. CIN. L. REv. 281, 303-05 (1973). Mr. Justice
Stewart in his California Motor Transport concurrence noted that the difference in the type of
governmental body might make a difference in the applicability of the antitrust laws if the peti-
tioner had made misrepresentations or had engaged in peijury, fraud or bribery. 404 U.S. at 517.
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analyze five case studies. Each one involves a possible antitrust viola-
tion, but similarly each one raises a possible Noerr-Pennington defense.
II. NOERR-PENNINGTON AND THE MEDICAL PROFESSION:
FIVE CASE STUDIES
A. Medicare Strikes.
The primary forum for organizing physicians for economic pur-
poses is the American Medical Association (AMA) and its component
medical societies.26 By using the mechanisms of professional ostra-
cism, backed up by reprimand, suspension or expulsion28 the medical
societies are able to enforce their standards of conduct. Because of this
power over the individual physician's earning capacity and profes-
sional status, the formation of joint activities against economically
threatening competitors, suppliers and customers is ielatively easy.2 9
One example of concerted activity involves the refusal of a local
medical society's members to accept Medicaid patients." By refusing to
treat these patients, the physicians are pressuring both state and federal
governments into paying higher fees in order to have the Medicaid pro-
gram continue.
26. See Note, The American Medical Association: Power, Purpose, and Politics in Organized
Medicine, 63 YALE L.J. 938, 942 (1954). In order for a physician to belong to the national organi-
zation, he must first be admitted to the county medical society. E. FREIDSON, PROFESSION OF
MEDICINE: A STUDY OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF APPLIED KNOWLEDGE 27 (1970); E. RAYACK, PRO-
FESSIONAL POWER AND AMERICAN MEDICINE: THE ECONOMICS OF THE AMERICAN MEDICAL
ASSOCIATION 3 (1967).
27. Rayack, Restrictive Practices of Organized Medicine, 13 ANTITRUST BULL. 659, 665-66
(1968); Note, supra note 26, at 949; see Group Health Coop. v. King County Medical Soc'y, 37
Wash. 2d 586, 626, 237 P.2d 737, 759 (1951) (non-member regarded as social outcast). Professor
Freidson has noted that the basic feature of the medical profession's system of control is its reli-
ance on the "boycott," which he defines as "the refusal by individual practitioners to enter into a
referral or collaborative relationship with those of whom they do not approve." E. FREIDSON,
PROFESSIONAL DOMINANCE: THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF MEDICAL CARE 94 (1970). However,
this sanction does not control the boycotted doctor's behavior, but rather has the effect of pushing
the physician outside of the observation and influence of those who disapprove of his work and
into the company of those with similar standards. Id Consequently, Freidson argues that the
controls used by the profession operate to place the disapproved-of doctors beyond the control of
the disapproving group. Id 101.
28. Note, supra note 26, at 950.
29. See Note, supra note 26, at 988; MED. WORLD NEWS, Jan. 26, 1976, at 6.
30. Recently, a Massachusetts ophthalmologist refused to treat a young child upon learning
that he was a Medicaid recipient. Am. Med. News, Jan. 31, 1977 at 12, col. I. Reportedly, the
physician told the patient's general practitioner that no specialist in the area would see the child.
Id In response to the incident, the Massachusetts Medical Society has taken the position that
those doctors who do not participate in the Medicaid program are free to choose their patients.
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This action against Medicaid patients constitutes a concerted re-
fusal to deal, and violates section one of the Sherman Act31 since it
unnecessarily restrains competition.32 The doctors, as individual com-
petitors, have conspired in order to force a consumer-in this case the
government-to accept their joint terms. By organizing together, the
physicians eliminated competition among themselves for the sole pur-
pose of setting the price charged the state and federal governments.
Moreover, the refusal to deal does not serve any non-commercial pur-
pose 33-- the only aim is to increase doctors' income-and consequently
unduly restricts competition within the meaning of section one.34
In defense, however, it could be argued that this type of concerted
physician activity is simply an effort to influence the state's funding of
its Medicaid program and is therefore protected by the Noerr-
Pennington umbrella.
There are strong reasons, however, why the Noerr-Penninglon
doctrine should not apply in this type of case. Although the Noerr-
Pennington defense has been upheld when the influencing activity in-
volved sought to have a governmental body make an anticompetitive
decision, in this instance the type of influencing activity used is in itself
anticompetitive, irrespective of the eventual government decision. A
31. A physician's strike is not exempt from antitrust liability because of the immunity given
to labor unions. See Craver, The Application of Labor and Antitrust Laws to Physician Unions.-
The Needfor Re-evaluation of Traditional Concepts in a Radically Changing Field, 27 HASTINGS
L.J. 55, 59 (1975).
32. Professor Sullivan argues that a concerted refusal to deal is distinguishable from a classic
boycott. Under his definition a boycott occurs only when a group of businessmen at one eco-
nomic level'(e.g., retail) combine to pressure suppliers into refusing to trade with a non-group
competitor, so both the purpose and effect of the boycott are to eliminate a competitor from the
market. L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST 230 (1977). In contrast, a con-
certed refusal to deal is organized not to eliminate a competitor but to obtain a favorable trade
advantage (e.g., higher prices or restrictive contracts) for the group. Id 257.
In the boycott situation Professor Sullivan suggests that the courts have imposed a per se
standard where the facts involve a distinctly anticompetitive purpose and effect. However, in the
concerted refusal to deal situation, the refusal may be based on legitimate reasons serving a useful
social purpose, (such as refusing to deal with a manufacturer of unsafe products) and thus only
constitutes an antitrust violation when the refusal to deal unreasonably restricts competition. Id
256-59.
33. An example of a non-commercial purpose for a concerted refusal to deal would be an
agreement by competitors not to use a harmful substance made by certain suppliers in a children's
product. L. SULLIVAN, supra note 32, at 259. See also Deesen v. Professional Golfers Ass'n, 358
F.2d 165, 170 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 846 (1966).
34. This activity is closely analogous to that of the suppliers of movie films in Paramount
Famous Lasky Corp. v. United States, 282 U.S. 30 (1930). In that case the film distributors
agreed to use only a contract which required the arbitration of disputes. Id at 37-40. The
Supreme Court found that the refusal to deal, except on the terms dictated, unreasonably sup-
pressed competition and thus violated the Sherman Act. Id at 43. In the case of the doctors, the
finding of a section one violation would be even more compelling.
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doctors' strike is qualitatively different from the many forms of "arm-
twisting" lobbying efforts that the courts have found to be reprehensi-
ble, but still within the protection of the doctrine.3 5 Since the means
used in the physicians' influencing effort itself involves a violation of
the Sherman Act, the normally impregnable first amendment barrier to
restricting petitioning of government becomes subject to a careful proc-
ess of judicial balancing. As Justice Douglas, a near-absolutist in first
amendment jurisprudence, observed in Caiffornia Motor Transport, "it
is well settled that first amendment rights are not immunized from reg-
ulation when they are used as an integral part of conduct which vio-
lates a valid statute."36 The harm caused by limiting the right to
influence government can thus be legitimately weighed against the so-
cial harm caused by the boycott.
In this case the harm involves the inability of the Medicaid patient
to receive treatment in the clinics of these practitioners. Treatment is
delayed and necessitates the inconvenience of either using a hospital or
traveling to a non-boycott area.37 Clearly, such a boycott frustrates the
congressional health policy 38 and violates the Sherman Act. On the
other hand, the doctors could argue that boycotting was the most im-
mediate and effective way of petitioning for relief. However, as in the
free speech cases, reasonable alternatives to the boycott should be con-
sidered. 39 The physicians have other means of influencing government
policy through more traditional lobbying activities. Consequently, use
of such a balancing test suggests that the Noerr-Pennington doctrine
should not apply.
35. For example, the Court in Noerr found the publicity scheme to be reprehensible, but
since it was a political activity, it was not within the sanctions of the Sherman Act. 365 U.S. at
140-41.
36. 404 U.S. 508, 514 (1972).
37. Under the Medicaid Act if a state accepts federal funds, its plan for medical assistance
must provide that any eligible person may obtain the medical services needed from any qualified
person or organization that undertakes to provide them. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396a (West Supp. 1978).
Under this provision treatment could be obtained at a participating hospital.
38. See 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1396-1396i (West Supp. 1978).
39. For example, in the free speech case of Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972),
Vietnam War protesters were arrested for trespassing while distributing anti-war handbills in a
privately-owned shopping center. Rejecting the war protesters' first amendment defense, the
Supreme Court stated that since alternative avenues of communication existed through the use of
nearby public property, it would be an unwarranted infringement on the owner's property rights
to require his rights to yield to the first amendment rights of the protesters. Id at 556-57.
Similarly, in the case of the doctors' Medicaid boycott alternative avenues of communica-
tion exist through the use of lobbyists and letter campaigns. Since these reasonable alternatives
are available, the Congressional policy of free competition as expressed through the antitrust laws
should not give way to the physicians' first amendment based Noerr-Pennington defense.
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A second justification for not applying Noerr-Pennington in this
situation is that the nature of the dispute-the proper price to pay for
medical services-suggests that the doctors' strike is within the judi-
cially created consumer exception to the Noerr-Pennington doctrine.40
The consumer exception was first presented in George . Whitten, Jr.,
Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc.," which involved competing dealers
in the pipeless swimming pool market. Both companies sought to fore-
close the other by persuading the school board's architect to include
specifications in the plans that only one of the two companies could
meet.42 In ruling on the Noerr-Pennington defense the court pointed to
the political nature of the decision made in Noerr and contrasted the
economic decision being made by the school board in the case before
the court.43 Since the school board had already decided to build the
pool,' it was acting as any other consumer in obtaining the best prod-
uct at the lowest cost. The school board was not engaged in a policy
determination, but merely acting as an economic decision maker under
a competitive bidding statute. Consequently, the efforts to influence
that decision were outside of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine's immu-
nity.4 5
By focusing on the type of government decision being made, the
Court must distinguish between policy decisions and economic transac-
tions. This distinction, however, will not always be easy; many spend-
ing programs are not only economic transactions but involve policy
considerations as well.46 In order to determine whether the Noerr-
Pennington doctrine should apply in these situations a court should
balance the degree of purely economic activity against the public policy
40. Both the First Circuit in George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc., 424
F.2d 25, 31-34 (Ist Cir.), cer. denied, 400 U.S. 850 (1970), and the District of Columbia Circuit in
Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 444 F.2d 931, 940-42 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1047
(1972), have recognized this exception. The Fifth Circuit initially accepted the rationale of this
exception in Woods Exploration & Producing Co. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 438 F.2d 1286,
1297 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1047 (1972), but later in Household Goods Carriers'
Bureau v. Terrell, 452 F.2d 152, 158-59 (5th Cir. 1971) rejected it. In United States v. Johns-
Manville Corp., 259 F. Supp. 440 (E.D. Pa. 1966), an early post-Noerr decision, the court did not
consider the government's role as a consumer in its decision, even though it was a factor in the
case.
41. 424 F.2d 25 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 850 (1970).
42. Id at 28.
43. Id at 32. Seizing upon the political aspect of the Noer, opinion, the court characterized
the government decision in that case as involving "some significant policy determination" while
the decision in Whitten dealt with "the best kind of weld to use in a swimming pool." Id
44. Id at 28.
45. Id at 33.
46. Id at 34. A specific example can be found in the Pennington decision itself. Under the
Walsh-Healy Act the Secretary of Labor in contracting for goods is required to insert minimum
wage levels for employees of the contracting party. 41 U.S.C. § 35(b) (1970).
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decision implicit in making the expenditure. Where the public policy
question outweighs the economic decision being made, influencing ac-
tivity should be protected by the doctrine; however, where the primary
decision concerns the price paid for particular goods or services, the
consumer exception should apply.
The use of this balancing test in the case of the doctors' Medicaid
strike suggests that the government's funding is primarily an economic
transaction. The policy decision to implement the Medicaid program
has already been made, leaving only the economic question of how
much money to spend. Characterized in this manner the case becomes
analogous to Whitten, since it involves a purely commercial transaction
between the government as buyer and physicians as sellers. Conse-
quently, the Medicaid strike falls within the definition of the consumer
exception and nullifies the use of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine as an
effective defense.
B. Malpractice Insurance Strikes.
Another type of refusal to work in which medical societies have
become involved is a work stoppage to protest the high cost of medical
malpractice insurance. In this situation the work stoppage is not an
effort aimed at setting a fee or eliminating a competitor, but rather it is
an attempt to force the state government to alleviate the rise in insur-
ance premiums. The refusal to work affects the insurers' ability to
charge the market rate for insurance, since insurers must seek rate in-
crease approval from the state. By putting pressure on the state insur-
ance commission through the work stoppage, the doctors are able to
reduce the requested increase.47
This type of organized resistance to the sellers' prices can be com-
pared with other forms of joint buyer activity against sellers. In the
commercial context when a well-organized group of buyers refuses to
purchase goods or services except for the demanded price, the market
price is affected.48 This kind of interference with the sellers' price is
simply the reverse of an organized group of sellers setting an artificially
high price for buyers.49 In both situations the organized group is able to
distort the competitive market price. Although few cases have dealt
47. For example, southern California physicians engaged in two work stoppages in order to
lower medical malpractice insurance rates. At that time one insurer was seeking a 486% increase
but was limited to 327% by the state insurance commission. MED. WORLD NEws, supra note 29, at
6.
48. See R. LiPsEy & P. STEINER, ECONOMICS 349-50 (3d ed. 1972) (discussion in context of
labor market).
49. See, eg., United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 397-98 (1927).
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with the organized buyers' effect on the market, those that have suggest
that if the purpose for the refusal to buy was to interfere in the sellers'
commercial dealings, it would constitute an antitrust violation.50
Similarly, in the medical malpractice work stoppage the doctors
are involved in an effort to interfere with the insurers' price. Although
the work stoppage is not a direct refusal to buy, it accomplishes the
same objective through a powerfully persuasive indirect route. If di-
rect interference with the sellers' price is illegal, then an indirect
method that seeks the same goal should also be illegal. Consequently,
the physician medical malpractice work stoppage should be regarded
as an indirect form of price control violative of the Sherman Act.
This type of case again confronts the question of the doctors' first
amendment right to petition as expressed through the Noerr-
Pennington defense. Using the balancing test developed above,5' the
scope of the constitutional right to petition should be determined by
balancing the social harm against the need to use this form of commu-
nication. The harm caused in this case is the denial of nonemergency
medical services to a large number of patients, especially those who
would be unable to travel to non-strike areas to obtain medical care.
5 2
On the other hand, the doctors' position would be that there existed an
immediate need to inform the government of their insurance plight.
However, the physicians' strike is not the only method of influencing
the state's legislative and executive bodies. Reasonable alternatives
through traditional lobbying efforts do exist and do not result in the
loss of medical services for a large segment of an area's population.
Consequently, the balancing test suggests that the Noerr-Penninglon
doctrine should not apply since the amount of social harm outweighs
the need to use the strike as a method of informing the government.
50. A distinction has been made between the refusal of organized buyers to purchase for
religious, social, political or other noncommercial purposes and one designed to further the buy-
ers' commercial and economic interests. In the former cases the reasonableness and legitimate
purpose for the refusal to buy have influenced the courts in not finding an antitrust violation; see
Community Blood Bank, 70 F.T.C. 728, 969-72 (1966) (Commissioner Jones, concurring), rey'don
other grounds, 405 F.2d 1011 (8th Cir. 1969). But see Council of Defense of State of New Mexico
v. International Magazine Co., 267 F. 390 (8th Cir. 1920) (organized refusal to buy on grounds
that seller was unpatriotic found to violate Sherman Act); Wall St. J., Mar. 16, 1978, at I, col. 5
(Nevada and Missouri, anti-ERA states, instituting antitrust suits against women's group for boy-
cotting the hotels in the state). However, in the latter cases the purpose for the refusal to buy was
purely economic, and thus it qualified as the type of activity that the Sherman Act was intended to
protect against. See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223 (1940) (combina-
tion formed to set price is a Sherman Act violation). See generally Coons, Non-Commercial Pur-
pose as a Sherman Act Defense, 56 Nw. U.L. Rav. 705 (1962).
51. See text accompanying notes 35-39 supra.
52. Not only would the patient suffer, but area hospitals would stand to lose substantial
revenues from the loss of patients. See MED. WORLD NEWS, supra note 29, at 6.
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Further, even if the strike is considered within the scope of the
right to petition, the method used may be characterized as a cover for
direct interference in the insurers' business relations and fall within the
sham exception to the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. Under the sham ex-
ception, as applied to the influencing of executive-legislative bodies, the
complaining party must demonstrate that the influencing activity was
"nothing more than an attempt to interfere directly with the business
relationships of a competitor."53 This test is very difficult to satisfy, as
a genuine effort to influence public officials can never violate the an-
titrust laws, regardless of what the defendant's direct or ulterior in-
tentions may be. The sham exception applies only where the
defendant is not really seeking to elicit government action at all.
54
Since the sham exception for legislative-executive bodies is difficult to
prove, the only post-Noerr case to discuss this point is Franchise Realty
Interstate Corp. v. San Francisco Local Joint Executive Board of Culi-
nary Workers.55 In Franchise Realty a subsidiary of McDonald's Cor-
poration sought to obtain licenses from the City of San Francisco for
three additional restaurants.56 A local union and several restaurant
owners repeatedly opposed McDonald's applications and were success-
ful in having them denied. McDonald's filed an antitrust action
against the union and restaurateurs, but this action was dismissed by
the Ninth Circuit on the basis of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine.58 The
court held that the legislative-executive sham exception applied only to
a publicity campaign59 and not to direct lobbying efforts. Furthermore,
the court noted that even if the exception applied to all lobbying efforts
the sham exception was applicable only if the influencing party was not
seeking any official action by a governmental body. 0 This requirement
that the complainant show that the defendant was not seeking any gov-
ernmental action severely limits the usefulness of the exception since
53. Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 144
(1961).
54. Handler, supra note 21, at 436. Professor Handler goes on to state that the sham excep-
tion of Noerr is so limited that it would be difficult for a case to fall within this limitation of the
doctrine. Id
55. 542 F.2d 1076 (9th Cir. 1976), cert denied, 430 U.S. 940 (1977).
56. 542 F.2d at 1078.
57. Id McDonald's claimed that the labor union's activities before the board were a sham
because the union's opposition was baseless, and augmented with threats of withdrawing the
union's political support for board members.
58. Id at 1086.
59. Since the union's alleged sham activities were before licensing boards, this case more
closely approximated the sham activities alleged in Caiffornia Motor. The court's discussion of
Noerr's sham limitation was thus unnecessary for its decision.
60. 542 F.2d at 1081.
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the defendant can easily make his activities appear as a legitimate at-
tempt to obtain legislative or executive approval for his position.
This restrictive interpretation of the executive-legislative sham ex-
ception makes its applicability to the doctors' malpractice insurance
strike questionable for two reasons. First, in order to use the exception
it must be shown that the strike was an attempt to directly interfere
with the business relations of another.6 This requirement is difficult to
meet since the striking doctors are not interfering with a competitor's
business relations but are affecting the relationship of a third
party-the insurer-with its regulator-the state government. As no
court has extended the sham exception to cover the effects of influenc-
ing activity on related businesses, an extension is unlikely under the
current restrictive interpretation of the sham exception.62
Second, even assuming the extension of the scope of the sham ex-
ception, the physicians' strike can easily be characterized as an attempt
to inform the government and to petition for relief. Since insurance is
a highly regulated industry and involves substantial state policy,63 the
legislated effects on the insurer due to the physician strike can be
viewed as proper remedial legislation. Consequently, the sham excep-
tion would not prevent the striking physicians from successfully using
the Noerr-Pennington defense.
C. Resistance to Health Maintenance Organizations.
A third type of trade restraining activity engaged in by medical
societies is organized resistance to alternative health care delivery sys-
tems such as Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs).' Medical
societies have opposed the concept of prepaid group health care due to
its change in the physician's receipt of payment.65 One technique for
61. Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 144
(1961).
62. See text accompanying notes 53-60 supra.
63. As an example of the degree of regulation of insurance in the medical malpractice field
see CAL. INS. CODE §§ 11890-11916 (West Supp. 1977) (California Medical Malpractice Joint
Underwriting Association Act).
64. The medical societies' strong resistance to the HMO concept led to one of the early
medical antitrust cases, American Medical Association v. United States, 317 U.S. 519 (1943), in
which the AMA's leaders were found criminally liable for coercing physicians into refusing to
work for a prepaid group health plan and denying the use of hospital facilities to the group's
doctors. Id at 527. Subsequent resistance has taken a more subtle approach but it continues
nonetheless. See Ohio ex rel. Brown v. Mahoney County Medical Soc'y, No. C76-168Y (N.D.
Ohio, Aug. 24, 1976) (antitrust suit filed by Ohio Attorney General against local medical society
for blocking formation of HMO in Youngstown, Ohio).
65. The primary difference between an HMO and traditional practicing physicians is the
method of payment. Under the traditional method a physician charges his fee in relation to the
number of services given to the patient. An HMO, by contrast, receives fixed periodic payments
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opposing an HMO is to actively challenge its license application before
a state administrative panel. 6 This type of organized resistance aimed
at denying a competitor access to the market is a per se violation of the
Sherman Act.67 However, in this case the physicians' efforts are di-
rected at a state agency and are within the general scope of the Noerr-
Pennington defense. This defense, though, is limited by the sham ex-
ception as applied to influencing activities before administrative agen-
cies.
The sham exception for administrative agencies was first enunci-
ated in Caifornia Motor Transport where the Supreme Court held that
certain abuses of the adjudicatory process, such as baseless, repetitive
claims, are not immunized from antitrust sanctions by the Noerr-
Pennington doctrine.6 This exception was subsequently restated in Ot-
ter Tail Power Co. v. United States.69 Otter Tail involved four towns
that sought to establish their own municipal distribution system in or-
der to purchase electricity at wholesale from the Otter Tail Power
Company, the area's sole supplier.70 Otter Tail refused to sell any elec-
tricity to the towns and instituted law suits in order to halt or delay the
municipal systems .7  The Court, in restating the California Motor
Transport sham exception, found that Otter Tail's repetitive litigation
from subscribers who are given whatever medical services they require within the time period
covered by the payments. Schneider & Stems, Health Maintenance Organizations and the Poor:
Problems and Prospects, 70 Nw. U.L. Rav. 90, 94-95 (1975).
66. For example, under Ohio law any person establishing an HMO is required to obtain a
certificate of authority from the state Superintendent of Insurance. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
1742.02 (Page Supp. 1976). The application for an HMO certificate could be opposed by physi-
cians and possibly lead to a denial of the authority.
67. Activity of this kind is aimed at restricting entry to a competitor and is closely analogous
to the classic boycott. See L. SULLIVAN, supra note 32, at 230. In antitrust terms the classic
boycott involves a situation where a group already in business is able to deny the non-group
competitors of some trade relationships that the non-group businessmen need to effectively com-
pete. Id For example, in Klor's v. Broadway-Hale Stores, 359 U.S. 207 (1959), a large chain
store retailer used its influence over wholesalers and manufacturers in order to have them refuse
to sell to a small competitor of one of Broadway-Hale's stores. Id at 209. The Supreme Court
essentially applied a per se rule, holding the activity of Broadway-Hale, the wholesalers and man-
ufacturers to be so destructive of competition that the reasonableness of the action was not to be
considered. Id at 212.
Similarly, the organized resistance of the medical society is directed at denying the HMO a
government license to operate. Just as Klor's could not compete without having a stock of goods
to sell, the HMO cannot legally operate its facility and compete with fee-for-service physicians of
the medical society without its license. Consequently, the medical society's response to the HMO
is an effort to deny an HMO entry to the market and is a per se violation of the Sherman Act.
68. California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 513 (1972). See text
accompanying notes 24-25 supra.
69. 410 U.S. 366 (1973).
70. Id at 371.
71. Id at 372.
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and insubstantial claims abused the judicial process and were within
this limitation of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine.72
Subsequent to California Motor Transport the lower court inter-
pretations of the sham exception have focused either on the repetitive-
ness of the litigation,73 the baselessness of the claim asserted,74 or the
intent to abuse the adjudicatory process.75 While all of these "tests" are
part of the sham exception, no one standard has emerged as predomi-
nant in determining when an abuse has occurred. Instead, the courts
are seeking to find some act reprehensible in terms of the adjudicatory
system. Once this act is found, the Noerr-Pennington immunity is
stripped from the abusing party and the court returns to an examina-
tion of the asserted antitrust violation.76
In the case of the medical society's organized resistance to the
HMO's license the sham exception is applicable if it can be established
that the opposing physicians' claims were baseless. Unlike many other
regulatory agencies, which are concerned with the economic impact of
a new service on existing providers of that service,77 the state agency's
72. Id at 380. Specifically, the Court stated that "the principle of Noerr may also apply to
the use of administrative or judicial processes where the purpose to suppress competition is evi-
denced by repetitive law suits carrying the hallmark of insubstantial claims and thus within the
'mere sham' exception." Id This language is confusing at best, but probably means that when
the adjudicatory process is abused by baseless lawsuits, it constitutes a sham. See Note, supra note
25, at 301. Fortunately, the lower courts that have addressed the case have correctly interpreted
Otter Tail to stand for a reiteration of the sham exception expressed in California Motor. See
Franchise Realty Interstate Corp. v. San Francisco Local Joint Executive Bd. of Culinary Work-
ers, 542 F.2d 1076, 1084 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 940 (1977); Lektro-Vend Corp. v.
Vendo Co., 403 F. Supp. 527, 534 (N.D. IlM. 1975), rev'd on other grounds, 433 U.S. 623 (1977);
Bethlehem Plaza v. Campbell, 403 F.Supp. 966, 970 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
73. See Bethlehem Plaza v. Campbell, 403 F. Supp. 966, 970-71 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (one lawsuit
not within sham exception). But see Associated Radio Serv. Co. v. Page Airways, Inc., 414 F.
Supp. 1088, 1096 (N.D. Tex. 1976) (if intent to abuse exists, one lawsuit sufficient).
74. See Rush-Hampton Indus., Inc. v. Home Ventilating Inst., 419 F. Supp. 19, 22-25 (M.D.
Fla. 1976); B.A.M. Liquors, Inc. v. Satenstein, [1976-2] Trade Cas. (CCH) T 60, 997 at 69, 411-13
(S.D.N.Y.).
75. Associated Radio Serv. Co. v. Page Airways, Inc., 414 F. Supp. 1088, 1094-96 (N.D. Tex.
1976). This case analyzes Caifornia Motor in terms of the distinction between a "concerted effort
to influence public officials regardless of intent and purpose and the concerted effort to abuse the
judicial or administrative process." d at 1096. This type of approach necessarily involves a
two-step analysis. The court first examines the facts for an act, such as the filing of a baseless
claim, and second, looks to find a purpose or intent to abuse the adjudicatory process.
76. Such an approach to a sham activity is consistent with its "activities" orientation. That
is, instead of analyzing the type of governmental decision or the relationship between the govern-
ment officials and the parties involved, the courts will look for acts which in themselves are abuses
of the adjudicatory process.
77. For example, in ICC motor carrier authority applications, one factor the Commission
specifically considers is whether traffic adequately handled by existing carriers will be diverted to
the applicant and thus weaken the financial position of the existing carriers. See, e.g., Grover v.
United States, [1976] Fed. Carr. Cas. (CCH) 1 82,642 at 57,239 (D. Utah); Terminal Transport Co.
APPL YING NOERR-PENNINGTON
task in evaluating the proposed HMO focuses on the HMO's ability to
deliver quality health care services. The legitimate issues before the
state agency are whether the proposed HMO has adequate financing
arrangements, whether the proposed facility is able to provide a full
range of medical services for its subscribers, and whether adequate ar-
rangements have been made with existing health care providers for ad-
ditional treatment if the HMO is unable to provide that special
service.78 Noticeably, none of these issues concern the financial impact
on the current practicing physicians in the proposed HMO's service
area, even though this issue is likely to be the motivating factor behind
the opposition to the HMO's certificate. As a result of the type of is-
sues considered by the state regulatory body, physician opposition has
to be based on legitimate health care quality concerns in order for the
physicians to avail themselves of the Noerr-Pennington defense.
Otherwise, the physician's claims are without merit on the proper issues
before the administrative agency and their baseless opposition would
fall within the sham exception to the doctrine.
D. Hospital Staff Privileges.
Hospital staff privileges allow a physician to admit patients to a
hospital and use its facilities for treatment purposes. These privileges
are recognized as a professional and financial necessity for the practic-
ing physician.
Those doctors who are admitted as members of the staff are not
employees of the hospital, rather they are independent professionals
who are permitted to use the hospital's facilities for treatment pur-
poses.80 When physicians as independent professionals act in concert
Extension-Birmingham and Florida Area, 103 M.C.C. 699, 715 (1967); Pan-American Bus Lines
Operation, I M.C.C. 190, 203 (1936).
78. Under the Ohio HMO certification procedure the state Director of Health is to evaluate,
inter alia,
1. whether the applicant has demonstrated an ability to provide basic health care
services as promptly as needed and in a continuous manner,
2. whether appropriate arrangements have been made for access to specialists
which are generally available in the area;
3. whether arrangements have been made for the availability of short-term emer-
gency health care services.
OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1742.04 (Page Supp. 1976). Further, the Superintendent of Insurance is
to evaluate the financial arrangements made with insurers and government agencies, the solvency
of the applicant, and the agreements made with participating doctors. Id. § 1742.05.
79. Moore v. Board of Trustees of Carson-Tahoe Hosp., 88 Nev. 207,213,495 P.2d 605, 609,
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 879 (1972) (rhompson, J., dissenting). Further, hospital staff privileges
have been recognized as a property right as well as a personal right. Edwards v. Fresno Commu-
nity Hosp., 38 Cal. App. 3d 702, 705, 113 Cal. Rptr. 579, 580-81 (1974).
80. See Dickinson v. Mailliard, 175 N.W.2d 588, 594 (Iowa 1970); Hull v. North Valley
Hosp., 159 Mont. 375, 387-88, 498 P.2d 136, 142-43 (1972); Southwick, The Hospital's New
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with other doctors to influence the hospital staff committees to deny
potentially competing, qualified applicants hospital staff privileges,8'
these physicians may be violating the antitrust laws. A violation may
be found even if the rule of reason rather than a per se approach is
deemed appropriate in this context.82
In many hospitals the staff privileges review committees can be
considered governmental bodies and physician influencing efforts di-
rected at these committees are initially protected by the Noerr-
Pennington defense. Thus the preliminary question is whether the par-
ticular hospital's staff privilege review committee is a public entity. In
Responsibility, 17 CLEv.-MAR. L. REV. 146, 155 (1968). However, in large hospitals interns, res-
idents and some specialists are employed full-time by the hospital and may be regarded as em-
ployees rather than independent contractors. See Hull v. North Valley Hosp., 159 Mont. 375, 387-
88, 498 P.2d 136, 142-43 (1972).81. See Note, Physician-Hospital Conflict: The Hospital Staff Privileges Controversy in New
York, 60 CORNELL L. REv. 1075, 1096 (1975). In testimony given before the New York State
Senate Committee on Health it was noted that in 1971 as many as thirty percent of the physicians
in the New York City area were without staff privileges. Further, the testimony indicated that in
Albany many doctors were effectively excluded from the area's most prestigious hospitals. Id at
1097 n.150 (citing the NEW YORK STATE SENATE COMMITTEE ON HEALTH, REPORT OF AcTIvi-
TIES 12-13 (1971)).
82. In antitrust terms the doctors who are members of the staff are using their positions to
block competitors from entering the market. Although this action in the commercial world con-
stitutes a per se violation of the Act, see Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co.,
364 U.S. 656, 659-60 (1961), in the hospital setting where credentials of the new applicant are
being appraised the rule of reason provides the better standard.
Under the rule of reason approach the reasonableness of the anticompetitive activity is ex-
amined in light of surrounding circumstances. See Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246
U.S. 231, 238 (1918). The primary factors to which the courts look are the purpose and effect of
the activity. After comparing these two factors any anticompetitive activity that is found unrea-
sonable is held to violate the Act. Id See also Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 60
(1911).
Without staff privileges a physician cannot admit patients to the hospital for further treat-
ment but must refer the patient to a doctor who does have the privilege. Since the effect of the
denial is to significantly restrict competition, the critical factor becomes the purpose behind the
denial. When the applicant is unqualified, it can be inferred that the purpose was to protect the
public from the unskilled practitioner, however, when the doctor is qualified but is still denied the
privilege, see Greisman v. Newcomb Hosp., 40 N.J. 389, 402-03, 192 A.2d 817, 824-25 (1963), the
refusal indicates an anticompetitive purpose behind the decision and hence a violation of the Act.
As further protection for the applicant the antitrust laws require that a self-regulatory body,
such as the hospital staff, afford the applicant notice and a hearing on his qualifications. This
requirement was established by the Supreme Court in Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S.
341 (1963), in which the Stock Exchange in exercising its self-regulatory powers directed its mem-
bers not to deal with a nonmember broker who used private telephone connections to communi-
cate with member firms. Id at 343-44. Since the nonmember broker was not informed of the
charges against him nor afforded an opportunity to refute these charges in a hearing before the
Exchange, the boycott of the nonmember broker was held to constitute a per se violation of the
Act. Id at 361-64. Consequently, even when the qualifications of the physician applicant could
be used to justify a denial of staff privileges and thus not give rise to the inference of an anticom-
petitive purpose, the hospital staff's denial would still be an antitrust violation if it failed to afford
the applicant his basic procedural rights.
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the private hospital these committees are appropriately viewed as arms
of a private business and not public regulatory groups. 83 Although the
ultimate purpose for the hospital may be to benefit the public at large,
this factor does not transform a private entity into a public institution.
Consequently, Noerr-Pennington's basic requirement of petitioning the
government would not be present and the defense would not be avail-
able.
In the public hospital, the question of whether the staff privileges
review committee is a public body can be answered by examining nu-
merous cases dealing with the applicability of fourteenth amendment
procedural due process rights. In these cases the courts have found
such committees to be sufficiently entwined with state and local govern-
ment to be subject to procedural due process requirements.84 If these
committees are considered governmental bodies for the purposes of
due process, consistency would dictate that the committees be regarded
as public bodies for the purposes of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine.
Automatic antitrust immunity does not necessarily follow, however.
Because of the close ties between the physicians on the committees and
those doctors influencing them," the co-conspirator exception to the
83. Schlein v. Milford Hosp., Inc., 561 F.2d 427 (2d Cir. 1977); Briscoe v. Bock, 540 F.2d
392, 394-96 (8th Cir. 1976); Comment, State Action in the Health Field, 1975 Wis. L. REv. 1188,
1189-90 (and authorities cited therein). See also Jackson v. Norton-Childrens Hosp., Inc., 487
F.2d 502 (6th Cir. 1973). However, the activities of private hospital staff privileges committees
may be considered as state action for fourteenth amendment purposes. Duffield v. Charleston
Area Medical Center, Inc., 503 F.2d 512, 515 (4th Cir. 1974). By analogy it can be argued that
they are performing a quasi-public function making the Noerr-Pennington doctrine applicable.
See Rush-Hampton Indus. v. Home Ventilating Inst., 419 F. Supp. 19, 22-25 (M.D. Fla. 1976).
84. Woodbury v. McKinnon, 447 F.2d 839 (5th Cir. 1971); Sosa v. Board of Managers of Val
Verde Memorial Hosp., 437 F.2d 173 (5th Cir. 1971); Jackson v. Fulton-Dekalb Hosp. Authority,
423 F. Supp. 1000 (N.D. Ga. 1976), afl'd, 559 F.2d 1214 (5th Cir. 1977); Comment, supra note 83,
at 1190 (authorities cited therein).
The courts have been willing to give these committees considerable latitude when reviewing
their decisions. For example, in one opinion Judge Goldberg stated:
It is the Board, not the court, which is charged with the responsibility of providing a
competent staff of doctors. The Board has chosen to rely on its Medical Staff, and the
court cannot surrogate for the Staffin executing this responsibility ... .The evaluation
of professional proficiency of doctors is best left to the specialized expertise of their peers
subject only to limited judicial surveillance.
Sosa v. Board of Managers of Val Verde Memorial Hosp., 437 F.2d 173, 177 (5th Cir. 1971). This
language implies that the courts are recognizing these committees as a type of administrative
body, since the standard used by the courts is similar to that used by courts when reviewing
federal administrative agency decisions. See, e.g., FPC v. Florida Power & Light Co., 404 U.S.
453, 463 (1972); Di Vosta Rentals, Inc. v. Lee, 488 F.2d 674, 678 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 416 U.S.
984 (1973); Frommhagen v. Klein, 456 F.2d 1391, 1393 (9th Cir. 1972); Montana Wildlife Fed'n v.
Morton, 406 F. Supp. 489, 491-92 (D. Mont. 1976).
85. For one example, see Feminist Women's Health Center, Inc. v. Mohammad, 415 F.
Supp. 1258, 1264 (N.D. Fla. 1976), modled, No. TCA 75-186 (N.D. Fla. Dec. 3, 1976), appeal
docketed, No. 77-1924 (5th Cir. 1977).
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Noerr-Pennington doctrine is applicable.
This exception was first recognized in Harman v. Valley National
Bank.8 6 In this case, Harman's complaint stated that several banks had
conspired with the Arizona Attorney General to close a competing sav-
ings and loan.87 The Ninth Circuit in sustaining the sufficiency of the
complaint held that even though these banks were petitioning the At-
torney General to use his statutory authority, the Noerr-Pennington de-
fense was not applicable where the government official was involved in
a conspiracy with the petitioning group.88 Little was stated to support
the court's position and the decision itself was disapproved by the
Ninth Circuit in Sun Valley Disposal Co. v. Silver State Disposal Co. 89
Subsequently, the Third Circuit in Duke & Co. v. Foerster9 ° revived
this exception. In Duke a manufacturer and seller of malt beverages
alleged that three municipal corporations, three private corporations
and a county commissioner had conspired to boycott the manufac-
turer's product.9' The court, in sustaining the validity of the allegations,
relied on the fact that "both Noerr and Pennington involved suits
against private parties,"92 rather than the collaboration of the govern-
ment entity in promoting the conspiracy. 93
This distinction, though essentially correct, glosses over the diffi-
culty involved in looking at the relationship between the parties. The
Third Circuit appeared to be distinguishing between the government
official who is simply supporting the position of one of the petitioners
and the government official who is actively involved in the anticompe-
titive scheme. When the government official is merely convinced that
the public policy would best be served by the approach advocated, the
traditional justifications for Noerr-Pennington apply.94 However, the
doctrine should not apply when the government official has a self-serv-
ing motive to benefit a certain group without considering the policy
86. 339 F.2d 564 (9th Cir. 1964).
87. Id at 566.
88. Id
89. 420 F.2d 341 (9th Cir. 1969). In disapproving Harman the Ninth Circuit relied on the
broad language of the Pennington decision concerning joint activities designed to influence public
officials. The court's reliance, though, seems misplaced. Pennington was concerned with a pri-
vate influence group's anticompetitive efforts rather than the personal monopolistic scheme of an
involved government official.
90. 521 F.2d 1277 (3d Cir. 1975).
91. Id at 1278-79.
92. Id at 1282.
93. Id The court's opinion relied on Harman as authority for this proposition apparently in
disregard of the Sun Valley opinion.
94. See United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965); Eastern R.R. Presidents
Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961); Bob Layne Contractor, Inc. v.
Bartel, 504 F.2d 1293, 1296 (7th Cir. 1974).
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aspects of the decision. 95
In the context of the hospital staff review committee the relation-
ship between the committee members and influential physicians is very
close because physicians in both groups have a vested financial interest
in limiting the number of staff privileges given out. Members of both
groups are in constant contact through a daily work relationship and
physicians in both groups are usually AMA members. Under these
conditions the physician-controlled committees are likely to be operat-
ing in conjunction with those doctors seeking denial of the application,
since such a recommendation is beneficial to both in limiting competi-
tion and maintaining work relationships. Although proof of a conspir-
acy involves a factual determination, when such a conspiracy is shown,
the co-conspirator exception removes the protection given by the
Noerr-Pennington doctrine to the petitioning doctors.
E. Medical Peer Review Groups.
In response to the high cost of health care and the growth in medi-
cal malpractice claims, both federal and state government have estab-
lished physician peer review groups. The prime example of this
regulatory measure is the Professional Standards Review Organization
(PSRO).96 Under this program those practitioners who provide health
care to patients under federally-funded medical programs97 can be re-
imbursed only when the local PSRO certifies that the services rendered
were medically necessary, in accord with professional standards or
norms of medical care, and incapable of being rendered at a lower cost
through use of alternative types of treatment.9 In order to implement
95. See Duke & Co. v. Foerster, 521 F.2d 1277, 1281-82 (3d Cir. 1975); Harman v. Valley
Nat'l Bank, 339 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1964). The difficulty in determining when the "line" is
crossed between these two types is well illustrated by Metro Cable Co. v. CATV of Rockford, Inc.,
516 F.2d 220 (7th Cir. 1975). In this case it was alleged that the mayor and one alderman were
involved in a conspiracy to grant a cable television license to one company. The company ob-
taining the license had given large campaign contributions to both of these officials. The court,
however, chose to construe these payments as merely campaign donations and not bribes. Thus,
the co-conspirator exception was found not applicable. Ad at 230; see Note, .4ntitrust Noerr-
Pennington Doctrine-Metro Cable Co. v. CATV of Rockford, Inc., 17 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L.
REv. 511,'517-18 (1976).
96. In 1972 Congress passed the PSRO law in order to stem the rise in medical costs. 42
U.S.C. §§ 1320c to 1320c-19 (Supp. V 1975). Subsequently, in 1975 the PSRO legislation was
found constitutionally acceptable. Association of Physicians and Surgeons v. Weinberger, 395 F.
Supp. 125 (N.D. IM. 1975). For a description of the statute and its requirements see J. BLUM, P.
GERTMAN & J. RABrNow, PSROs AND THE LAW 19-57 (1977).
97. The programs include Maternal and Child Health Care, 42 U.S.C. §§ 701-716 (Supp. V
1975); Medicare, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1395-1395qq (West Supp. 1977) and Medicaid, 42 U.S.C.A. §§
1396-1396j (West Supp. 1977).
98. 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-4 (Supp. V 1975). The program is intended to expand to cover all
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the PSRO program, the PSRO is charged with determining norms of
care, diagnosis and treatment based on typical patterns of practice in
the PSRO's region.99
In addition to the federal PSRO program some states have either
implemented state PSROsIo or granted existing physician groups such
as hospital staffs and medical societies self-regulatory powers.101
Within the framework of those peer review groups there exists the po-
tential for doctors to use them for anticompetitive purposes.
This use of a peer review group for anticompetitive purposes is
demonstrated by Feminist Women's Health Center, Inc. v. Moham-
mad 102 In this case the Feminist Women's Health Center (Center), an
abortion clinic, began operations in Tallahassee, Florida in June of
1974.103 From that time until July, 1975, local physicians practiced at
the Center without significant interference from other physicians in the
community. In June, 1975 a local newspaper investigated local abor-
tion services and compared the cost of an abortion at the
Center-$150.00-with the $400.00 charged by local obstetricians for
comparable services." After the article was published, the local obste-
trician working at the clinic quit. °5 At the same time the local obstetri-
cians, acting through the Obstetrics and Gynecological (OB-GYN) staff
of the area's only hospital and led by doctors who competed with the
Center for abortions, refused to associate with the Center on the basis
of some advertising it had done.' 06 Further, the OB-GYN staff wrote to
services provided by health care practitioners under federally-funded programs. 42 U.S.C. §
1320c-4(g) (Supp. V 1975). For a discussion of the PSRO's ability to contain health care costs see
Havighurst & Blumstein, Coping with Quality/Cost Trade-Offs in Medical Care. The Role of
PSROs, 70 Nw. U.L. REv. 6 (1975).
99. 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-5 (Supp. V 1975). The regional area to be covered by a PSRO was
contested in Texas. The state medical society sought to have a single statewide region while
HEW had divided the state into nine districts. The district court in that case found that HEW's
decision was based on undue influence from congressional sources and set aside HEW's plan.
Texas Medical Ass'n v. Mathews, 408 F. Supp. 303 (W.D. Tex. 1976).
100. A few states have established peer review groups to promulgate norms and/or investi-
gate the quality of care being rendered by licensed practitioners. COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 12-43.5-
101 to 12-43.5-103 (Supp. 1976); MD. ANN. CODE art. 43, § 134A (Supp. 1977); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 145.61-.67 (West Supp. 1977); Wyo. STAT. §§ 35-528 to 35-530 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
101. FLA. STAT. ANN . § 395.065 (West Supp. 1977) (currently under legislative review, FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 11.61 (West Supp. 1977)).
102. 415 F. Supp. 1258 (N.D. Fla. 1976), modoed, No. TCA 75-186 (N.D. Fla. Dec. 3, 1976),
appeal docketed, No. 77-1924 (5th Cir. 1977).
103. Id at 1265.
104. Id at 1264-65.
105. Id at 1265. After the release of the newspaper story the physician who quit working at
the Center stated that he would provide informal back-up care but "would not enter into a formal
agreement for fear of incurring the animosity of his fellow obstetricians whose goodwill is essen-
tial to his practice." Id
106. Id One of the leaders in the OB-GYN staff, Dr. Mohammad, admitted to another
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the local medical society stating that the Center had advertised and that
no physician should associate with it. 107
Upon the refusal of local doctors to participate with the Center, it
obtained the services of two residents from a Jacksonville, Florida hos-
pital."08 The Tallahassee doctors became aware of these new doctors
and the OB-GYN staff decided to send a letter to the residents and the
head of the Jacksonville residency program stating their disapproval of
the residents' work at the Center.'0 9 This letter stated that the Center
had inadequate backup arrangements with local doctors in case of
complications and that such practice was disapproved of by physicians
in the local community as falling below the area's medical standards.1 0
On the basis of this letter and the Center's controversial position, the
two residents also quit working for the Center.II Faced with a boycott
of local doctors, the Center filed an antitrust action against them. In
order to continue its abortion services, the Center moved for a prelimi-
nary injunction against the OB-GYN staff's refusal to work.112
In this case the competing doctors' activity in eliminating the
Center's supply of physicians can be characterized as a classic boy-
cott.113 The doctors used their leadership positions on the hospital staff
peer review group to impede the competing Center's "supply" of physi-
cians. Under traditional antitrust analysis, this constitutes a violation
of the Sherman Act.' 14
doctor that his main opposition to the center's practices at the beginning was that the Center was
financially embarrassing his own abortion practice. Id at 1266.
107. Id at 1265. In response to this letter the medical society conducted an investigation of
the Center's activities. Brief for Appellant at 19-22.
108. 415 F. Supp. at 1266.
109. Id
110. Id
111. Id at 1266-67.
112. Id at 1262.
113. See L. SULLIVAN, supra note 32, at 230.
114. This case is not unlike Klor's v. Broadway-Hale Stores, 359 U.S. 207 (1959), in which
the Supreme Court essentially applied a per se rule and held unlawful the actions of a large chain
store retailer. The store had used its influence over wholesalers in order to have them refuse to
sell to a small competitor of the chain store. See note 67 supra. In Feminist Women's Health
Center, as in Klor's, a powerful provider had used its influence to cut off the necessary supplies of
a competitor. Using a Klor's analysis, the doctor's actions would constitute a per se violation of
the Sherman Act.
However, the competing doctors were operating within a professional group that had self-
regulatory powers, see note 118 infra, as distinguished from K/or's where Broadway-Hales Stores
and Kor's were merely retail competitors. Since the competing doctors had self-regulatory power
over the actions of their colleagues, it may have been reasonable to influence the doctors to leave
the Center if these doctors were performing substandard work. This recognition of the profes-
sional setting suggests that the rule of reason's purpose and effect test is the better approach to use
in evaluating the anticompetitive activity. In this case the effect is clearly anticompetitive. The
purpose, however, depends upon the reason behind the competing doctors' activity. Since the peer
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As one defense to the antitrust claim, the physicians asserted that
communications with the medical society and the Jacksonville hospital
staff, as well as communication within the local OB-GYN staff were
covered by the Noerr-Pennington doctrine.' 15 The district court initially
rejected this defense, stating that the hospital staff medical review com-
mittees and the local medical society were private bodies, not state
sanctioned regulatory groups,' 16 and thus Noerr-Pennington did not
apply.
Subsequently, the defendant physicians presented the district court
with additional evidence showing first, that hospital staffs and medical
societies were required by statute to furnish the State Board of Medical
Examiners with information of any disciplinary actions taken against
member doctors,'" 7 and second, that hospital staffs were authorized by
the state to engage in disciplining their members."' On the basis of this
statutory scheme the district court reversed itself and characterized the
medical society and the two hospital staffs as quasi-public bodies.11 9
This characterization enabled the court to apply the Noerr-Pennington
doctrine to the influencing activities of the obstetricians, both as indi-
viduals and as a staff. Since these activities provided the basis for the
Center's antitrust claim, the application of the Noerr-Pennington de-
fense immunized the physicians from antitrust liability. 120
In determining whether the medical society and the hospital staffs
were quasi-public bodies, the court used a straightforward state action
analysis. It looked to the statutory duty to report disciplinary actions1 2 1
review group did not concern itself with any disciplinary actions against the doctors who worked
at the Center, but preferred merely to have these doctors quit the Center, the suggested purpose
for the action was the removal of a competitor from the market. Without a legitimate purpose to
offset the anticompetitive effect, the doctors' use of their power and influence over other physi-
cians was unreasonable and a violation of the Act.
115. 415 F. Supp. at 1268-69.
116. Id
117. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 458.1201(l)(p) (West Supp. 1977). This statute provides that
any medical association, PSRO or similar body, or hospital staff which takes disciplinary action
against a member physician is to report such action to the Board of Medical Examiners within
thirty days of its occurrence. Id
118. Id § 395.065 (West Supp. 1977) (currently under legislative review. FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 11.61 (West Supp. 1977)). This statute provides, in part, that
[t]he medical staff of any hospital licensed pursuant to this chapter is authorized to sus-
pend, deny, revoke, or curtail the staff privileges of any staff member for good cause
Id
119. Feminist Women's Health Center, Inc. v. Mohammad, No. TCA 75-186 (N.D. Fla.
Dec. 3, 1976), appeal docketed, No. 77-1924,(5th Cir. 1977).




and the state policy of permitting physician self-regulation1 22 and con-
cluded that the activities of the medical societies and hospital staffs
were governmental in nature.
The district court's adoption of a state action analysis to cover all
activities of these organizations, however, is questionable in light of the
Supreme Court's decision in the analogous field of antitrust state action
immunity. In Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co. '23 the Court expressed its
intention to narrowly construe the antitrust immunity given private or-
ganizations for following the dictates of the state. 24 According to one
analysis of Cantor, in order to qualify as state action the state not only
has to expressly mandate the action, but it must be shown that first, the
private group is acting pursuant to a statutory mandate which compels
the action, second, the state statute is repugnant to the federal antitrust
laws, third, the state's interest in creating the statutory scheme out-
weighs the antitrust policies, and finally, in order to achieve the goals of
the state scheme, it is necessary to immunize the actions of the private
group.' 25
Applying Cantor's restrictive approach to the hospital staffs and
medical society in Feminist Women's Health Center suggests that only
the reporting of disciplinary actions of their member physicians would
satisfy the above criteria.126 Because this reporting of disciplinary ac-
tion is only one activity out of many performed by the hospital staffs
and medical societies, Cantor would not clothe these groups with state
action antitrust immunity for all purposes. This direct comparison
with Cantor, though, must be tempered by the physicians' status as
professionals and the traditional state policy permitting self-regulation
122. Id
123. 428 U.S. 579 (1976).
124. In Cantor the Detroit Edison Company, an electric utility, had engaged in a light bulb
exchange program for years with the tacit approval of the state regulatory agency. A competitor
in the light bulb market claimed that the exchange program was in violation of the Sherman Act.
In deciding the validity of Detroit Edison's state action defense, the Court found that the program
was not initiated by the state and that there was no basic state policy behind its sanctioning of the
exchange program. For a general discussion of the Cantor decision see Comment, The State
4tion Exemption in4ntitruwt: From Parker v. Brown to Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 1977 DutKE
L.J. 871.
125. Dorman, State Action Immunity:.A Problem Under Cantor v. Detroit Edison, 27 CASE
W. REs. L. REv. 503, 520-21 (1977).
126. Under the Cantor analysis the reporting function is clearly mandated by state statute
(FLA. STAT. ANN. § 458.1201(l)(p) (West Supp. 1977)), could at times affect a competing doctor
and be contrary to the federal antitrust laws, involves the state's significant interest in health care,
and is part of the state regulatory program.
The hospital staflfs statutorily granted disciplinary power (FLA. STAT. ANN. § 395.065
(West Supp. 1977)) would not satisfy a strict Cantor analysis as the statute is not phrased in
mandatory terms compelling the hospital staffs to engage in disciplinary proceedings.
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of doctors' activities. Clearly, the courts have given greater leeway in
terms of antitrust enforcement to professional activities than those of
commercial enterprises. 27 However, the fact that doctors enjoy a pro-
fessional status should only serve to extend Cantor's antitrust immu-
nity to those activities of the hospital staffs and medical societies that
directly contribute to the improvement of the professional service to the
public. 128
By comparison the characterization of the hospital staffs and medi-
cal societies as quasi-public for purposes of the Noerr-Pennington doc-
trine should only extend to those functions that directly relate to the
public interest as expressed through the state's health care regulatory
policy. In Feminist Women's Health Center, only the formal discipli-
nary proceedings invoked against physicians should rise to the level of
quasi-governmental status with immunity extended only to that aspect
of the staff's and the society's activity. 129
Tested by this standard the activities of the Tallahassee and Jack-
sonville hospital staffs and the Capital Medical Society do not consti-
tute quasi-governmental functions. Clearly the Tallahassee OB-GYN
staff was not concerned with the incompetence of its own members, but
rather was concentrating on a competing non-member organiza-
tion--the Center--over which the staff had no power to discipline for
127. For example, in Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975) the Court stated
that
it would be unrealistic to view the practice of professions as interchangeable with other
business activities, and automatically to apply to the professions antitrust concepts which
originate in other areas. The public service aspect... of the professions may require
that a particular practice, which could properly be viewed as a violation of the Sherman
Act in another context, be treated differently.
Id at 787 n.17.
128. In Boddicker v. Arizona State Dental Ass'n, 549 F.2d 626 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 825 (1977) the Ninth Circuit harmonized Cantor's strict state action stand with Goldfarb's
expressed leniency to the professions by stating that
to survive a Sherman Act challenge a particular practice, rule, or regulation of a profes-
sion, whether rooted in tradition or the pronouncements of its organizations, must serve
the purpose for which the profession exists, viz. to serve the public. That is, it must
contribute directly to improving service to the public. Those which only suppress com-
petition between practitioners will fail to survive the challenge.
549 F.2d at 632. Similarly, the Supreme Court in National Soe'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United
States, 98 S. Ct. 1355 (1978), also restricted the reach of Goldarb by noting that
the cautionary footnote in Goldfarb. . . cannot be read as fashioning a broad exemp-
tion under the Rule of Reason for learned professions. We adhere to the view expressed
in Gold/arb that, by their nature, professional services may differ significantly from other
business services, and, accordingly, the nature of the com etition in such services may
vary. Ethical norms may serve to regulate and promote tins competition, and thus fall
within Rule of Reason ....
[However], the Rule of Reason does not support a defense based on the assumption that
competition itself is unreasonable.
Id. at 1367-68 (footnote omitted).
129. See FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 395.065, 458.1201(I)(p) (West Supp. 1977).
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improper medical care.1 30 So too, the medical society was investigating
the Center's practices and not that of one of its member physicians. 131
Finally, the communication to the Jacksonville hospital staff was not
directed at the incompetence or negligence of one of its residents, but
rather at the Center's lack of back-up arrangements.132
Since none of these organizations were functioning in a recognized
quasi-governmental capacity, their status was that of a private organi-
zation and whatever communication or influencing efforts passed be-
tween them was in a private capacity. Consequently, the Noerr-
Pennington defense should not have been applicable.
Beyond the immediate issues involved in Feminist Women's Health
Center is the question concerning the use of the Noerr-Pennington doc-
trine when a peer review group is functioning within its quasi-govern-
mental capacity, but its power to discipline is used against a member
physician for anticompetitive purposes. The situation can be por-
trayed by changing slightly the facts in Feminist Women's Health
Center. Instead of the hospital staff directing its actions against the
Center, the setting is changed so that sanctions are sought to be im-
posed directly on the doctors who performed the Center's abortions.
Competing staff doctors would then be simultaneously functioning in
two roles: first as a group seeking to influence a governmental unit to
reach an anticompetitive decision favorable to them and second as part
of the governmental body being influenced. Because the influencing
activity is combined with doctors' status in the second role as members
of a governmental body, the premise behind the co-conspirator excep-
tion can be applied.
As noted above, the underlying rationale of the co-conspiracy ex-
ception is that the government officials who are being petitioned are not
functioning in their proper capacity of weighing the various policy con-
siderations, rather they are furthering their own economic self-inter-
est.'33 Since in this example the competing doctors used their position
for the purpose of eliminating a competitor rather than judging the
medical ability of the "disciplined" physician, the same reasoning ex-
ists for applying the exception.' 34 The only difference between this ex-
130. See text accompanying notes 106-07 supra.
131. See note 107 supra.
132. See text accompanying notes 109-10 supra.
133. See text accompanying notes 94-95 supra.
134. The use of the co-conspirator exception's underlying rationale is supported by the
Supreme Court's decision in Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564 (1973). In that case a state associa-
tion of private practice optometrists sought to have the State Board of Optometry revoke the
licenses of all competing optometrists who were employed by business corporations. Since the
Board was composed exclusively of private practice optometrists, the Court disqualified the Board
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ample and the context in which the exception developed is that the
influencing group is itself a part of the governing body rather than an
outside group of competitors who are in league with the members of
the governing body. This factual difference is necessarily due to the
peer review group's organization as a state sanctioned group of compet-
itors who are given the power to police their own conduct. However,
this distinction does not change the policy behind denying the influenc-
ing group the protection of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine as the physi-
cians in their role as government officials are not fulfilling their task in
regulating the quality of the area's health care, but are using their posi-
tion for economic gain. 135
III. CONCLUSION
Despite the broad wording and liberal application of the Noerr-
Pennington doctrine in a commercial antitrust action, the use of the
doctrine in a medical antitrust case should be limited. As the five case
studies suggest, application of the doctrine should be controlled by two
primary considerations: the definition of the group being influenced (as
private or governmental), and the various judicially recognized excep-
tions. Any physician-dominated regulatory group that is subject to
doctor-instigated lobbying efforts should be firmly tied to the state's
regulatory scheme in order to be characterized as a governmental body,
and Noerr-Pennington immunity should extend only to those activities
of the group that are directly concerned with regulation, such as disci-
pline for malpractice. By the same token, the various judicially cre-
ated exceptions to Noerr-Penninglon immunity should be liberally
applied so as to restrict immunity from antitrust regulation. Although
Noerr-Pennington is a valid device for insuring that the antitrust laws
do not restrict the private sector's access to government, it is used per-
versely in situations where the "governmental body" that is asked to
sanction anticompetitive activity is really nothing more than the private
sector itself, slightly reconstituted and relabelled.
from hearing the charges due to the possibility of the Board using its position for economic gain.
Id at 578-79. Although this case involved a question of procedural due process, it reinforces the
premise that members of a governmental body are not properly fulfilling their assigned task when
the purpose or potential purpose behind their action is personal economic gain.
135. With the co-conspirator exception's emphasis on the purpose behind the physicians'
influencing activity the burden of proof becomes a key factor in the exception's usefulness. Al-
though the burden is usually placed on the complainant to show an exception to an affirmative
defense, such as the Noerr-Penninglon doctrine, in this case the potential for an anticompetitive
purpose is so great that the defending physicians should be required to show a non-economic
purpose behind their action in order to avail themselves of the defense.
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